Daily Plan
更新: 5/3/2025 字数: 0 字 时长: 0 分钟
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Daily Study
更新: 5/3/2025 字数: 0 字 时长: 0 分钟
GPT翻译论文Prompt
通识文献模板：
#角色：你是一位精通简体中文的专业翻译
曾参与《纽约时报》和《经济学人》中文版的翻译工作，因此对于新闻和时事文章的翻译有深入的理解。我希望你能帮我将以下英文新闻段落翻译成中文，风格与上述杂志的中文版相似。
#规则：
- 翻译时要准确传达新闻事实和背景。
- 保留特定的英文术语或名字，并在其前后加上空格，例如："中 UN 文"。
- 分成两次翻译，并且打印每一次结果：
1. 根据新闻内容直译，不要遗漏任何信息
2. 根据第一次直译的结果重新意译，遵守原意的前提下让内容更通俗易懂，符合中文表达习惯
#初始化
本条消息只需要回复OK，接下来的消息我将会给你发送完整内容，收到后请按照上面的规则打印两次翻译结果。IT翻译模板:
#角色：你是一位精通简体中文的专业翻译
曾参与《ACM SIGCOMM》、《ACM SIGMOD》和《USENIX Security Symposium》中文版的翻译工作，因此对于计算机、数据库、系统和网络安全研究领域的翻译有深入的理解。我希望你能帮我将以下摘自USENIX会议中的段落翻译成中文，风格与上述会议的中文版相似。
#规则：
- 翻译时要准确传达相关技术事实和背景。
- 保留特定的英文术语或名字，并在其前后加上空格，例如："中 UN 文"。
- 分成两次翻译，并且打印每一次结果：
1. 根据相关技术的英文内容直译，不要遗漏任何信息
2. 根据第一次直译的结果重新意译，遵守原意的前提下让内容更通俗易懂，符合中文表达习惯
#初始化
本条消息只需要回复OK，接下来的消息我将会给你发送完整内容，收到后请按照上面的规则打印两次翻译结果。论文翻译
更新: 5/3/2025 字数: 0 字 时长: 0 分钟
1. INTRODUCTION
TLS is a powerful,widely deployed protocol that allows users to access web data over confidential, integrity-protected channels. But TLS has a serious limitation: it doesn’t allow a user to prove to third parties that a piece of data she has accessed authentically came from a particular website. As a result, data use is often restricted to its point of origin, curtailing data portability by users, a right acknowledged by recent regulations such as GDPR [8]. Specifically, when a user accesses data online via TLS, she cannot securely export it, without help (hence permission) from the current data holder. Vast quantities of private data are thus intentionally or unintentionally locked up in the “deep web”—the part of the web that isn’t publicly accessible. To understand the problem, suppose Alice wants to prove to Bob that she’s over 18. Currently, age verification services [1] require users to upload IDs and detailed personal information, which raises privacy concerns. But various websites, such as company payroll records or DMV websites, in principle store and serve verified birth dates. Alice could send a screenshot of her birth date fromsuch a site, but this is easily forged.And even if the screenshot could somehow be proven authentic, it would leak information— revealing her exact birth date, not just that she’s over 18. Proposed to prove provenance of online data to smart contracts, oracles are a step towards exporting TLS-protected data to other systemswith provenance and integrity assurances. Existing schemes, however, have serious limitations. They either only workwith deprecated TLS versions and offer no privacy from the oracle (e.g., TLSNotary [7]) or rely on trusted hardware (e.g., Town Crier [78]), against which various attacks have recently emerged, e.g., [24]. Another class of oracle schemes assumes server-side cooperation, mandating that servers install TLS extensions (e.g., [65]) or change application-layer logic (e.g., [31, 77]). Server-facilitated oracle schemes suffer from two fundamental problems. First, they break legacy compatibility, causing a significant barrier to wide adoption. Moreover, such solutions only provide conditional exportability because the web servers have the sole discretion to determine which data can be exported, and can censor export attempts at will. A mechanism that allows users to export any data they have access to would enable a whole host of currently unrealizable applications.
1.1 DECO
To address the above problems, we propose DECO, a decentralized oracle for TLS. Unlike oracle schemes that require per-website support, DECO is source-agnostic and supports any website running standard TLS. Unlike solutions that rely on websites’ participation, DECO requires no server-side cooperation. Thus a single instance of DECO could enable anyone to become an oracle for any website. DECOmakes rich Internet data accessiblewith authenticity and privacy assurances to a wide range of applications, including ones that cannot access the Internet such as smart contracts. DECO could fundamentally shift today’s model of web data dissemination by providing private data delivery with an option for transferto third parties or public release. This technical capability highlights potential future legal and regulatory challenges, but also anticipates the creation and delivery of appealing new services. Importantly, DECO does not require trusted hardware, unlike alternative approaches that could achieve a similar vision, e.g., [54, 78]. At a high level, the prover commits to a piece of data and proves to the verifier that came from a TLS server ( and optionally a statement c about . E.g., in the example of proving age, the statement c could be the predicate “ =~/💔 is Alice’s date of birth and the current date - is at least 18 years.” Informally,DECOachieves authenticity:The verifier is convinced only if the asserted statement about is true and is indeed obtained from website (. DECO also provides privacy in that the verifier only learns the that the statement c holds for some obtained from (.
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